## Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should provide all necessary resources for cooperative binational border engagement with Mexico.

## Advantage Two – US Mexico Relations

#### First, despite the growing importance of US-Mexico relations, new BILATERAL initiatives are necessary to jump start improvements – improving the movement of people and goods is the key location for dialogue.

O’Neil 2013  
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

#### Successful cooperation on border crossing for goods spills over into other areas of relations – it’s the best opportunity to improve relations.

Bonner & Rozental 2009   
Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The 1,952-mile land boundary between the United States and Mexico is the place where the most contentious and difficult issues in the bilateral relationship play out – from undocumented migration and contraband trafficking to the allocation of water in a thirsty region. Nevertheless, the border region remains poorly understood – both by policymakers in distant federal capitals and by the public at large. Most people who do not live along the border or cross it frequently are unaware of the challenges of border management or of the ways in which Mexico and the United States are attempting to meet those challenges. Changes on the ground – and local responses to them – frequently outpace both national policies and public perceptions. The conjunction of a technologically advanced, capital-rich society and a modernizing, labor-exporting country creates the potential for both synergy and strife. The challenge confronting Mexico and the United States is to mitigate the conflicts that inevitably arise from this dichotomy while seizing all potential opportunities the differences generate. We envision a system of border management that moves people and goods between the United States and Mexico far more quickly and efficiently than the present arrangement but that also enhances the security of both nations. This new system would facilitate trade, encourage the emergence of regional economic clusters, promote wise stewardship of shared natural resources, and enhance efforts to preserve ecosystems that cross the national boundary. Perhaps most importantly, it would invite communities that dot and span the frontier to exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Ultimately, the border should be as “thin” and transparent as technologically and politically possible for those engaged in legitimate travel or commerce but difficult to penetrate for those engaged in criminal activity or unauthorized transit. Management of this shared boundary should serve as a model for binational collaboration in confronting shared challenges.

#### Plan solves pressures on broader relations questions – it would create the opportunity for a significant increase in US-Mexico relations.

Olson & Lee 2012   
Eric L Olson serves as Associate Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Erik Lee serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University. “The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region” Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border August 2012 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Security_Olson_Lee.pdf>

Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from increased bilateral collaboration and independent domestic progress on key issues affecting security in the United States and Mexico. Significant progress has been made in increasing and improving bilateral security collaboration between federal agencies on both sides of the border. While a welcome development, these advances can, in some cases, weakened the long-standing cooperation between local U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. While it is important to continue strong federal coordination, encouraging local collaboration can also yield significant and important dividends in fighting crime affecting cross-border cities. Improved border management, a challenge during normal fiscal times, is particularly difficult in the United States’ constrained fiscal environment and thus requires increased attention and creative solutions. For example, the two governments—in close collaboration with border communities—should focus their efforts on making the land ports of entry from San Diego to Brownsville as safe and efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic security. One such effort has been the highly controversial experimental deployment of the SBInet system on the Arizona-Sonora border. While this technology has been deployed on the border between the ports of entry, the governments have not deployed technology in a game-changing way that could convert the ports of entry themselves into true platforms for economic security rather than highly congested and bureaucratized nodes in our North American commercial network.

#### Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.

Pastor 2012   
Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of The American Interest http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

#### Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

## 1NC – Relations Advantage

#### 1. No Impact – the US-Mexico partnership is too big to fail – areas of cooperation will always overwhelm differences

Rozental 2013   
Andrés Rozental, former deputy foreign minister of Mexico, works primarily on global governance issues, U.S.-Mexico relations and international migration. He served for many years in Mexico’s diplomatic corps. February 1, 2013 “Have Prospects for U.S.-Mexican Relations Improved?” Brookings Institute http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/02/01-us-mexico-rozental

The Mexico-U.S. relationship won't substantially change; there are too many ongoing issues to expect any major shift in what has become a very close and cooperative bilateral partnership in economic, security and social aspects. There will be a change of emphasis from the Mexican side as far as the security relationship goes, with Peña Nieto's declared intention to focus much more on the economy and public safety. He has already moved away from the constant statements made by his predecessor extolling the number of criminals apprehended and 'successes' in the fight against organized crime. The change of message comes as a relief to many Mexicans tired of hearing about violence and crime on a daily basis.

#### 2. No Solvency: improving cross-border trade isn’t sufficient – problems related to the drug trade will undermine cooperation

Walser 2013   
Ray Walser, Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation “Obama in Mexico: Change the Reality, Not the Conversation” 5/1/13 <http://blog.heritage.org/2013/05/01/obama-in-mexico-change-the-reality-not-the-conversation/>

Of course there is much value in an opportunities-oriented approach to U.S.–Mexico relations. The two countries have unique ties based on patterns of trade, investment, integrated manufacturing, and the movement of peoples. Both nations should continue to deepen this relationship by focusing on everything from trade, global competitiveness, and modernizing and securing our shared 2,000-mile border in ways that advance economic freedom and improve educational quality and energy development. Yet addressing hard, seemingly intractable issues related to the illicit traffic in drugs, people, guns, and money moving with relative ease across the U.S.–Mexico border remains a major challenge for both leaders. The Obama Administration has done little to reduce drug demand in the U.S. Consumption of marijuana is on the rise among teens. There is legal confusion in Washington following passage of legalization measures in Colorado and Washington. Resource reductions for drug interdiction and treatment are built into the fiscal crisis. Prior objectives for drug prevention and treatment established by the Obama Administration have not been met, according to the Government Accountability Office. Meanwhile, cash and guns flow south largely unchecked into Mexico. Cooperation with Mexico may be scaled back or waning as U.S. officials are excluded from intelligence fusion centers the U.S. helped to set up. A new emphasis on citizen security may take the law enforcement heat of trafficking kingpins, who will likely attempt to move drugs across Mexico with less violence and greater efficiency as Mexican law enforcement focuses on the most violent criminal elements.

#### 3. No Impact – Mexico is not a security challenge for the US.

Valdez 2009  
Diana Washington Valdez Experts say government stable despite mounting border violence / El Paso Times 2/9/2009 http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci\_11606866

Before Hayden's recent retirement from the CIA, he said Mexico could rank alongside Iran as a security challenge for President Barack Obama, maybe even a greater problem than Iraq, while the Joint Forces Command's "JOE 2008" said Mexico and Pakistan's governments were in danger of collapse. Professor Josiah Heyman, a Mexico expert at the University of Texas at El Paso, said it's unlikely Mexico's governability has reached such a crisis stage. "Part of the alarm was sparked by the fact the drug violence is taking place right next door to our border, in Juárez," Heyman said. "There are things in Mexico that are very negative, but others that are very positive, too. For example, it is managing its economy very well, it has stabilized the price of oil, and it's a real functioning democracy. "But, it has not spread the wealth, and many decades have passed while the purchasing power of the Mexican people has fallen below what it was in 1982." Heyman said a counter or alternative state must exist before a current state can collapse. While certain factors can lead to a government's collapse, Mexico still lacks a strong counter-state to fulfill all the conditions for a political meltdown.

#### 4. No Internal Link – Mexico is just not critical to American hegemony – the advantage is a joke.

## 2AC Cards

### Ext – Relations key to Heg

#### The US-Mexico partnership is critical to US hegemony.

Smith 2013   
Simon Bolivar Professor of Latin American Studies at University of California in San Diego.[1] He has been president of the Latin American Studies Association since 1989, Ph.D. in Comparative Politics, Latin America from Columbia University “Global Scenarios and Bilateral Priorities” Mexico and the United States : the politics of partnership I Peter H. Smith and Andrew Selee, editors. P. 19-20

A more nuanced interpretation of unipolarity emerges from the recent work of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a widely respected academic and former national security adviser. Despite a visible shift of power from the West toward the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, Brzezinski asserts that "America's role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism." "America is still peerless," he says, although it must rise to meet a range of challenges. domestic and international. Like Kagan, he concludes that it is a matter of national will: "The key to America's future is thus in the hands of the American people."12 In contrast to Kagan and others, Brzezinski stresses the importance of geographic location as a major asset for the United States. By this he means not only its "splendid isolation" from turbulence on other continents, but also the presence of a "good neighborhood"-marked by peaceful and cooperative relations with Canada and Mexico. Tranquility within the neighborhood thus enables the United States to project and sustain its power in other parts of the world.1.'.I This insight provokes an extended meditation by Brzezinski on US relations with Mexico. With evident concern, he focuses on the likely consequences for Mexico of a serious decline in US power: A waning partnership between America and Mexico could precipitate regional and even international realignments. A reduction in Mexico's democratic values, its economic power, and its political stability coupled with the dangers of drug cartel expansion would limit Mexico's ability to become a regional leader with a productive and positive agenda. This, in the end, could be the ultimate impact of American decline: a weaker. less stable. less economically viable and more anti-American Mexico unable to constructively compete with Brazil for cooperative regional leadership or to help promote stability in Central America. 14 Alternatively, one might have speculated on reverse cause and effect: the impact on the United States of Mexican decline, especially a descent into state failure. Even so, Brzezinski makes a fundamental point: Mexico provides a significant pillar for US power and it therefore deserves concomitant attention from policymakers.

#### A breakdown of cooperation with Mexico would cause the decline of American power.

Clarkson & Mildenberger 2011   
Stephen Clarkson, professor of political economy, University of Toronto, and former fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center Matto Mildenberger, Ph.D. student, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct Us Power p. 272

The United States’ relationship with Canada and Mexico thus presents a paradox. Does North America Exist? showed that globalization was reducing the salience of North America as an economic entity, whether in the steel sector ‘s global restructuring or in the international consolidation of banking regulations. However, even as North American regionalism falters, the United States’ immediate periphery is becoming a more important partner in sustaining its material power. Constrained by its global partners’ superior growth rates, the United States can still count on the unusually beneficial economic relationship it quietly maintains with its continental periphery. Although it normally ignores its neighbours’ interests when dealing with other countries, its gradual decline no longer affords Washington this luxury without having to pay a price. That price is its two neighbours expanding their strategic gaze from the continent to the world. Canada and Mexico are endeavouring to strengthen their economic links with other countries. Indian capital is already investing in iron-ore extraction in Quebec, while Chinese firms are staking out Alberta’s tar sands. Even with disputes over Newfound land’s seal industry and its visa restrictions on Czech visitors, Canada has busily negotiated a comprehensive economic trade agreement with the European Union. Hosting the G-20 Economic Summit in 2012, Mexico is positioning itself as the champion of emerging economies and the developing world. This economic internationalization could mitigate Canada’s and Mexico’s lopsided dependencies on a US market to which their access has been curtailed since 9/11. Should they succeed in diversifying their economic links by attracting more FDI from overseas and should their extra-regional imports and exports abroad begin to expand more than their intra-regional trade, the United States’ economic perimeter in North America will contract, and their construction of US material strength will ipso facto diminish. The North American periphery has been Uncle Sam’s gold-laying goose for as long as most can remember. It would make an ironic epitaph for the United States’ hegemonic decline if alienating its most valuable and easily cultivated foreign asset accelerated its self-induced fall.

### A2: Relations Resilient

#### Relations with Mexico are not inevitable, the US needs to shift to cooperation to solve.

Carlsen 2013  
Laura Carlsen is director of the CIP Americas Program in Mexico City “Obama in Mexico” 6/3/13 <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/03/obama-in-mexico/>

There is no doubt that recasting Mexico from a national security threat to a partner would be a positive and long-overdue step forward. The way in which Mexico has been portrayed as a threat—as a source of spillover drug violence, a failed state, a home to terrorist migrants, etc.—has distorted reality and devastated the bi-national relationship. On his trip Obama stated that the U.S.-Mexico relationship “must be defined not by the threats that we face but by the prosperity and the opportunity that we can create together.” It’s just not clear that the shift is genuine. Aid to both Mexico and Central America continues to be heavily skewed to the drug war, including military and police aid, and training programs and “institution-building” among judiciary and penal institutions to support U.S. counternarcotics objectives. While State Department aid to Mexico may decrease somewhat, Department of Defense aid is growing and in Central America security aid is slated to rise 20% over already rising 2012 levels, as noted at the first SICA-North American Security dialogue held in Washington days before Obama’s visit.

#### Even if relations are inevitable, it’s a question of whether or not the relationship is smooth.

Hakim & Litan 2002  
 Peter Hakim is president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based policy organization tank on Western Hemisphere affairs. “; Robert E. Litan Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution. J.D. Yale, M. Phil. and Ph.D. in Economics Yale. Dr. Litan has served in several capacities in the federal government: As Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice; and Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers. Future of North American Integration. “Introduction” Brookings Institution Press, 2002. p 28.

Even if the three governments take no further steps, the economies, societies, cultures, and institutions of three countries should continue to integrate on their own accord. The three countries now face a decision of whether and how they should seek to accelerate, smooth, and institutionalize this integration process. This will not be a simple challenge. Much more dialogue between the three governments and their citizens will be required to reach consensus on the broad goals and specific policies that any such further integration may entail. The major objective of this volume and of the North American project is to begin this dialogue and the search for ways to develop “win-win-win” strategies for all three countries and their citizens.

### Cooperation Solves Relations

#### **Cooperation on the border is critical to solve US-Mexico relations**

Lee and Wilson 12  
(Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University, Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Well-being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” June 2012, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State\_of\_Border\_Trade\_Economy\_0.pdf)

Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great—yet underappreciated—success stories of the global economy. In fact, in 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade probably reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition.1 The United States is Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico—which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades—is the United States’ second largest export market and third largest trading partner. Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where “the rubber hits the road” for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management. Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled.

#### Reinforcing and expanding US-Mexico economic connections is essential to relations over the long term.

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Michael Schiffer President of the Inter-American Dialogue “A More Ambitious Agenda” A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s commission on Mexico-US relations. February http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042\_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf

Mexico and the United States are more closely tied to one another than any other sovereign nations in the world, and the pace of their economic and demographic integration is accelerating. For both, sustained cooperation on an array of bilateral, regional, and global issues is essential. They have no choice: No other country affects the lives of US citizens more than Mexico, and none affects the lives of Mexicans more than the United States. No two countries have more to gain from pursuing closer and more robust ties. A continued reinforcement and expansion of bilateral economic relations is fundamental for both countries. Much still must be done to improve cross-border access to markets, investment capital, technology, human resources, and energy supplies. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16 trillion economy is a vital destination for Mexican products and a critical source of capital and technology. And there is room for it to contribute even more to Mexico’s economic performance. For its part, the rising Mexican economy, which some experts predict will emerge as the world’s fifth largest by midcentury, will inevitably become more and more central to the United States’ economic future. The United States and Mexico would also benefit from working harder and smarter to resolve their differences and to address some crucial shared problems. Immigration and public security are the central priorities for the coming period. And the two nations should cooperate more on global and regional matters. Challenges to democracy and human rights in Latin America and beyond, growing security problems in Central America, reintegration of Cuba into hemispheric affairs, reform of multilateral organizations, development of new trade partnerships worldwide, and problems of nuclear non-proliferation and climate change are among the many issues that deeply concern both countries. Although, on many of these matters, the United States and Mexico will disagree, they are, nonetheless, natural partners on all of them.